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INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF AGENCIES IN 
POLARIZED GOVERNMENT 
Cynthia R. Farina* & Gillian E. Metzger** 
Peter Strauss’s The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch1 reshaped contemporary thinking about the 
constitutionality of federal administrative government. When the article 
appeared in 1984, the Reagan Revolution was in full swing. Reagan’s 
overtly antiregulatory policy stance and his Administration’s advocacy of 
a highly formalist and originalist style of constitutional interpretation 
fundamentally challenged the post–New Deal administrative state. 
Aggressive interpretation of Article II led to controversial strategies of 
White House control: centralized rulemaking review, appointment of 
agency heads loyal to the President’s (anti)regulatory agenda, and 
attacks on institutions of administrative independence such as the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions and career civil servants.2 
The Place of Agencies was a masterful defense of the constitutional 
legitimacy of American administrative government. Professor Strauss 
insisted on the essential constitutional distinction between the apex—
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court—and the vast apparatus 
of administration beneath. In this view, the Constitution prescribes strict 
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers only at the apex.3 
Below this level, two other structural principles dominate: a separation-
of-functions requirement rooted in due process and a checks-and-
balances concern with avoiding excessive accumulation of power in any 
single governmental entity.4 Administrative agencies are constitutional so 
long as they have relationships of control and accountability with each of 
the actors at the apex: “The three must share the reins of control; means 
                                                                                                                           
 *. William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Faculty 
Director, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), Cornell Law School. 
 **. Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center for Constitutional 
Governance, Columbia Law School. 
 1. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies]. 
 2. See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming 
Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1130–
31 (2008) (noting significant increase in politicization of appointments and agency 
personnel under Reagan Administration); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277–80 (2001) (describing development of centralized regulatory 
review under Reagan Administration); Kevin M. Stack, Obama’s Equivocal Defense of 
Agency Independence, 26 Const. Comment. 583, 585–94 (2010) (describing Reagan 
Administration’s attack on independent agencies). 
 3. Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 1, at 577–78. 
 4. Id. 
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must be found of assuring that no one of them becomes dominant.”5 In 
emphasizing the constitutional need for significant relationships between 
agencies and all of the “opposed, politically powerful actors at the apex 
of government,”6 Professor Strauss pushed back on assertions of unitary 
presidential control. Rather, as he developed further in later work, the 
President is to be an “overseer,” not a “decider”—a supervisory role 
shared in important ways with Congress.7 
Our own thinking about separation of powers is so deeply indebted 
to  Professor Strauss’s work that we relished the opportunity to consider 
The Place of Agencies thirty years later. Some things have not changed 
much: centralized regulatory review, politicized agency appointments, 
and agency independence remain fiercely debated.8 More fundamentally, 
however, the world seems a very different place. Funding the government 
has become an ongoing exercise in political “chicken” that debilitates 
agency planning9 and unsettles domestic and international financial 
markets.10 Delays have so plagued the agency appointments process that 
a Democrat-controlled Senate finally exercised the long-threatened 
“nuclear option” of limiting the filibuster.11 Overall, the productivity of 
the 112th and 113th Congresses fell to levels historically associated with 
national crises.12 No one would have described the Reagan or Clinton 
years as eras of good feeling between the House, Senate, and White 
House. Still, major social and economic legislation was enacted and 
                                                                                                                           
 5. Id. at 579–80. 
 6. Id. at 581. 
 7. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704–05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, 
Overseer or Decider]. 
 8. The literature on these issues is vast, and Professor Strauss, has not surprisingly, 
been a leading participant in the ongoing debate. See, e.g id., at 700–05 (describing and 
rejecting claims of unitary executive power by the Bush II Administration); Peter L. Strauss, 
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 968–75 (1997) (describing increased 
presidential role in and politicization of rulemaking). For a sampling of the broader debates 
in other scholarship on point, see Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative 
Law: Cases and Comments 213–42, 685–761 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing centralized 
regulatory review, presidential direction of agency decisionmaking, agency independence 
and presidential removal power, and appointments). 
 9. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 11) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 10. See, e.g., Katy Burne, Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, Markets Are Anxious Over 
Fears of Default, Wall St. J. (Oct. 12, 2013, 12:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 
424052702304500404579129801171185802 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 11. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger “Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on 
Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-
poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21 
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [http://perma.cc/3N4V-GEWL]. 
 12. Daniel Newhauser, No, the 113th Congress Wasn’t the Least Productive Ever, 
Nat’l J. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/no-the-113th-congress 
-wasn-t-the-least-productive-ever-20141223 [http://perma.cc/98J7-WZS7] (citing analyses 
of political scientists Sarah Binder and David Mayhew). 
 
 
government (despite some conspicuous stutters like the 1995 to 1996 
shutdowns), for the most part, moved forward.13 The George W. Bush 
years saw increasingly incandescent partisan rhetoric and unparalleled 
presidential adventurism, but the perceived exigencies of September 11 
and four years of rare unified party control allowed government, for the 
most part, to continue.14 By late in the Bush II Administration, however, 
scholars had begun to speak of “broken” institutions,15 and the Obama 
years have seen growing pessimism about the capacity of a 200-year-old 
constitutional structure to produce reliable, effective governance.16 
How does this altered political reality affect the complex inter-
institutional roles and dependencies traced out in The Place of Agencies? Are 
gridlock and partisan “tribal warfare”17 the new normal at the apex of 
national government? If so, the intricate system of separated, checked-and-
balanced powers that Professor Strauss so adroitly described may be 
vanishing—an anachronism to which lip service must be given, so long as 
the Constitution is formally unamended, but which must be mitigated and 
circumvented by those seeking reliable, effective governance. If, instead, 
hope remains for abating polarization and hyperpartisanship, can the 
institutions of administrative government below the apex facilitate this 
shift by, for example, providing opportunities for bipartisan engagement 
and the emergence of new areas of common ground? 
These are very large questions that obviously cannot be resolved in 
this setting. The pair of essays that follow do, however, make a start. 
In Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 
Cynthia Farina looks at the phenomenon of polarization, focusing on the 
rancorous and embattled legislative branch the Constitution places at the 
forefront of our system of government. Divided into two chambers with 
very different representational bases, and saddled by the Constitution 
and longstanding practice with various supermajoritarian hurdles to 
action, Congress has always suffered significant structural challenges as a 
political actor—especially as compared with the President.18 Perhaps for 
                                                                                                                           
 13. See David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S. 
Constitutional System 45 tbl.2.1, 69 tbl.2.3, 73 tbl.2.4 (2011) (presenting success of Reagan 
and Clinton, with other modern Presidents, in getting legislative agendas through Congress). 
 14. See id. (highlighting passage of USA Patriot Act and other 9/11-driven legislation 
as well as Bush II Administration’s overall success from 2005 to 2006 and in early 2001). 
 15. E.g., Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress 
Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 17 (2008). 
 16. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional 
Dysfunction?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 1–3) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 17. Congress as ‘The Broken Branch,’ Wash. Post (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001155.html [http:// 
perma.cc/WB7Q-5ZHB]. 
 18. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (contrasting “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and despatch” of energetic single 
executive with deliberateness of numerous legislature). 
 
 
this reason, dire warnings about congressional dysfunction have a 
venerable history in American political commentary.19 In recent years, 
however, institutional disability seems to have degenerated into institu-
tional incapacity. Now, Congress often manages to be only a spoiler of 
others’ initiatives, unable to engage productively in the shared enterprise 
of governing contemplated by the Constitution. 
Hyperpartisan legislative deadlock has already significantly affected 
the behavior of the other actors at the apex, as well as the operation of 
administrative government beneath.20 If this condition is unlikely to 
improve, the constitutional and policy implications are profound. 
Balance cannot be maintained, nor can the reins of control over 
administration be shared, if one of the principal actors has retreated into 
self-absorbed obstructionism. Professor Farina’s contribution reviews the 
rich political science literature on polarization to discover what is known 
about its nature, degree, and causes. She finds some core areas of 
agreement, much unresolved conflict about important dimensions, and 
little definitive evidence about causation. (This last is perhaps fortunate, 
for most of the proposed remedies would require changes in the 
Constitution, embedded electoral processes, or both.) Most important 
for present purposes, she discerns several areas in which the potential 
exists for shifts in a depolarizing direction. Things are not certain to get 
better—but they are also not nearly so certain as the sound-bites suggest 
to stay this bad. 
Against this backdrop of guarded optimism, in Agencies, Polarization, 
and the States, Gillian Metzger examines how high levels of polarization 
have changed regulatory government and how, in turn, agencies might 
contribute to changing polarized politics. Partisan warfare conducted 
within divided government necessarily affects the relationships of control 
and accountability that are the subject of The Place of Agencies. Most 
centrally, as legislative deadlock undermines Congress’s ability to direct 
agency action, the President is incentivized and empowered to use 
agencies as tools for unilateral policymaking. Still, these recognized effects 
of polarization tell only part of the story. With broad powers exercisable 
without the kinds of inter-institutional agreement that hyperpartisanism 
can stymie, agencies continue to govern even in highly polarized times. 
This ongoing ability to make and adapt major federal policy enables 
agencies to shape, as well as be shaped by, the political environment. A 
critical element of this dynamic is the role played by state governments in 
federal programs, which can reinforce national political divides but also 
motivate new crosscutting alliances. 
Professor Metzger examines these complex effects using the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a case study on administration and polar-
                                                                                                                           
 19. E. Scott Adler & John D. Wilkerson, Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving 
3–4 (2013). 
 20. See Metzger, supra note 9, passim. 
 
 
ization in practice. The ACA stands as the poster child for hyperparti-
sanship. Repealing Obamacare remains the Republican Party’s unifying 
mantra, while the Obama Administration has embraced significant uni-
lateral actions in its zeal to make the Act work. The picture of imple-
mentation, however, is far more complex, with red states increasingly 
reaching deals with the Administration to expand Medicaid and the 
Department of Health and Human Services taking a flexible approach to 
bring as many states as possible on board. The story of the ACA thus 
reinforces the need for more nuanced accounts of the place of agencies in 




TERMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION? 
Cynthia R. Farina* 
Political polarization has become a major focus in contemporary 
discussions on congressional activity and governance. The tone of these 
discussions has grown increasingly grim, as many political scientists 
argue that a constitutional system of divided and shared powers 
hardens current levels of partisan warfare into legislative gridlock. 
Proposals for reform abound. Scholars and political commentators have 
called for modifications to the electoral process and to party structure, 
for additional oversight of the culture among members of Congress, and 
for increased attention to demographics and economic inequality within 
the electorate. These proposals sometimes conflict, and usually face 
daunting legal or political obstacles to adoption. 
In an effort to better assess the likelihood that congressional 
dysfunction will be the norm going forward, this Essay reviews and 
synthesizes recent political science literature with the goal of sorting out 
what we know—and, perhaps more important, do not know—about the 
nature, extent, and causes of congressional polarization. The Essay begins 
by discussing standard metrics of congressional polarization and describing 
alternative approaches that challenge the standard account as overly 
simplistic. It then looks at historical trends to consider whether the 
contemporary situation is truly anomalous. Next, it considers the many 
theories put forth to explain the phenomenon, focusing initially on whether 
congressional polarization can be explained by polarization in the electorate 
and then moving to proposals around the electoral process, party structure 
and culture, and demographics. Finding little support in the literature for 
the notion that the challenged structures and practices are actually driving 
legislative polarization, the Essay concludes by suggesting that the rhetoric 
around congressional polarization—particularly around the likely 
continuation of partisan warfare and legislative gridlock—is far more 
negative than the existing evidence can justify. 
 
 





                                                                                                                           
 *. William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Faculty 
Director, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), Cornell Law School. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“[P]olarization is the defining narrative of our time.” 
~ Joshua Huder 1 
In 2012, two congressional scholars from opposite political poles—
Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution and Norman Ornstein of the 
American Enterprise Institute—collaborated on a book2 arguing that 
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Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution and Norman Ornstein of the 
American Enterprise Institute—collaborated on a book2 arguing that 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Joshua Huder, Political Parties Are Often Too Convenient an Explanation, Rule 22 
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/04/28/political-parties-are-often-too-convenient-
an-explanation/ [http://perma.cc/M5N4-T6ZD]. 
 2. Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the 
American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (2012). 
 1. Joshua Huder, Political Parties Are Often Too Convenient an Explanation, Rule 22 
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/04/28/political-parties-are-often-too-convenient-
an-explanation/ [http://perma.cc/M5N4-T6ZD]. 
 2. Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the 
American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (2012). 
 
hyperpartisanship has “led Congress—and the United States—to the brink 
of institutional collapse.”3 Writing more recently in the Wall Street Journal, 
Brookings scholar William Galston echoed this concern: “Abroad as well as 
at home, observers question America’s ability to govern itself as the times 
require.”4 
Political polarization has absorbed the attention of political scientists 
over the last fifteen years.5 As these examples suggest, the tone of this work 
tends to be grim: The parties, especially the Republicans, have increasingly 
acted like parliamentary parties in a winner-take-all system—while trying to 
govern in a constitutional system of divided and shared powers with multiple 
vetogates.6 The resulting institutional stalemate, and associated political 
misbehavior, has led a wide range of scholars and political commenters to 
call for significant modifications to the Constitution, the organization and 
the operation of electoral politics, or both.7 That such reforms face 
formidable legal, political, and institutional obstacles only heightens the 
apocalyptic tenor of the discussion. 
It has thus become impossible to think about the place of agencies in 
contemporary American government without first coming to terms with 
the political polarization that seems to jeopardize Congress’s constitutional 
responsibility for regulatory oversight. If the level of dysfunctional partisan 
conflict is unlikely to shift without reforms that are unlikely to occur, then 
the Straussian model of agency legitimation—which rests on relationships 
of genuine control and accountability with each of the three principal 
constitutional actors8—must be fundamentally revisited. A perpetually 
gridlocked Congress is unable, in Professor Strauss’s metaphor, to “share 
the reins of control.”9 The resulting imbalance in control and account-
                                                                                                                           
 3. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Basic Books, http://www.basicbooks.com/full-
details?isbn=9780465074730 [http://perma.cc/F2N2-4Q42] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). 
 4. Willliam A. Galston, Americans Are as Polarized as Washington, Wall St. J. (June 3, 
2014, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/william-a-galston-americans-are-as-polarized-as-
washington-1401837373 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 5. E.g., Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized 
Politics: Volume One (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006); Red and Blue Nation? 
Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics: Volume Two (Pietro S. Nivola & 
David W. Brady eds., 2008); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of 
Polarization, in Negotiating Agreement in Politics 19 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin 
eds., 2013), http://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSA%20Files/publications/MansbridgeTF 
_FinalDraft.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HCK-WQUB] [hereinafter Barber & McCarty, Causes and 
Consequences]. 
 6. See Morris P. Fiorina, Gridlock Is Bad. The Alternative Is Worse, Wash. Post: 
Monkey Cage (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp 
/2014/02/25/gridlock-is-bad-the-alternative-is-worse/ [http://perma.cc/ASU3-Y2K9]. 
 7. See discussion infra Part IV (reviewing various remedial proposals). 
 8. See Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 577–80 (1984). 
 9. Id. at 580. 
 
ability would raise hard questions about the constitutionality, as well as the 
wisdom, of an increasingly president-centered regulatory state.10 
This Essay reviews and synthesizes recent political science literature 
with the goal of sorting out what we know—and, perhaps more important, 
do not know—about the nature, extent, and causes of congressional 
polarization. By focusing in particular on systematic studies and evidence-
based conclusions, the Essay seeks to better assess the likelihood that dys-
function in the legislative branch will be the norm in regulatory politics 
going forward. The discussion proceeds as follows: 
Part I explains the most commonly used metric of congressional 
polarization: roll-call voting. This metric shows steadily increasing distance 
between the Republican and Democratic caucuses in both chambers since 
the 1980s; this is largely accounted for by the Republican caucus becoming 
more conservative. Part I then examines alternative methodological ap-
proaches that reach a less pessimistic, or at least far more complex, con-
clusion about Congress’s continuing capacity for bipartisan action. These 
approaches—which examine a range of qualitative as well as quantitative 
evidence—caution against the over-simplification of an exclusive focus on 
roll-call votes. 
Part II focuses on historical trends in congressional polarization. Since 
the post–Civil War era—when today’s Republican and Democratic parties 
first emerged—polarization levels (measured by roll-call voting) have 
shown considerable volatility. The contemporary level is a record, but 
Congress has “recovered” from earlier periods of high polarization. The 
previous high point, 1890 to 1910, is especially noteworthy because of 
several apparent similarities with the present era. 
Part III considers the extent to which legislative polarization can be 
explained by polarization in the electorate. If divisions between Republican 
and Democratic members reflect extreme partisan conflict among those 
they represent, then congressional dysfunction is symptomatic of a far larger 
problem and is even more likely to be intractable. Although there is 
disagreement among political scientists, it appears that polarization is largely 
a phenomenon of “elite” politically active citizens, and even these indi-
viduals tend to depart from their party’s position on at least one issue they 
care about. Most of the electorate hold a mix of conservative and – 
preferences that are not well represented by either party’s current platform. 
This heterogeneity can potentially destabilize partisan gridlock, as both 
parties are pressured to redefine their issue positions to secure the loyalty of 
a critical number of these votes. 
Part IV reviews other kinds of explanations offered for congressional 
polarization, and the remedies advocated. The proposed explanations 
range from assertions that current electoral structures and practices distort 
                                                                                                                           
 10. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 12–17) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(describing nature and impact of presidential unilateralism). 
 
 
representational outcomes, through arguments that the political parties 
have too much, or too little, power, to theories about party culture and 
broad population demographics. The proposed remedies often conflict. 
Given the low probability of accomplishing most of these remedies at the 
national level, it is perhaps fortunate that there is little solid evidence that 
the challenged structures and practices are actually driving legislative 
polarization—or that the proposed reforms would succeed in reducing it. 
This review ultimately suggests that the rhetoric around congressional 
polarization—particularly around the likely continuation of partisan 
warfare and legislative gridlock—is far more negative than the existing 
evidence can justify. This is not meant to deny that Congress in recent 
years has experienced significant problems in fulfilling its constitutional 
role of policymaking and oversight. Rather, it is an argument against 
viewing the present era as so exceptional that it falls outside the historical 
ebb and flow of partisan contention, and beyond the capacity of existing 
constitutional institutions to survive. 
I. DETERMINING THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION 
“To say simply that parties are polarized is to define what parties are.” 
~ Brady & Han 11 
“Polarization” does not have a uniform, clearly articulated definition 
among political scientists, but with respect to Congress, the term 
generally refers to the average distance between the preferences of the 
median Democratic and Republican Members.12 The most widely 
employed metric, “DW-Nominate,” uses roll-call vote behavior to array 
legislators relative to their colleagues on a liberal/conservative scale.13 
Long-term “bridge” legislators are used to build comparisons across 
Congresses over time.14 Figure 1 shows the results: Since the 1970s, the 
Republican and Democratic caucuses have become increasingly 
                                                                                                                           
 11. David W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical 
Perspective, in Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized 
Politics: Volume One, supra note 5, at 119, 119–20 [hereinafter Brady & Han, Then and 
Now]. 
 12. E.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 20; cf. Boris Shor, 
How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting More Polarized, Wash. Post: Monkey 
Cage (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/14/ 
how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarized-in-2-graphs/ [http://perma 
.cc/4ZPR-RTS7] (using same definition for state legislatures). 
 13. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, Voteview, http://voteview.com/ 
political_polarization_2014.htm [http://perma.cc/4UGW-BMB6] [hereinafter Voteview, 
Polarization of Parties] (last updated Mar. 21, 2015). 
 14. Nolan McCarty et al., Polarization Is Real (and Asymmetric), Wash. Post: Monkey Cage 
(May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/15/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/ 
[http://perma.cc/36M5-VWDR] [hereinafter McCarty, Polarization is Asymmetric]. 
 
homogenous and distant from each other. Polarization is greatest in the 
House, but the Senate is not far behind, with the two trending together. 
FIGURE 1:PARTY POLARIZATION 1879–2014  
DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE 
 (LIBERAL–CONSERVATIVE) DIMENSION15 
 
The conclusion that Congress is highly polarized encompasses three 
distinct but reinforcing observations. First, the two major political parties 
have become internally more ideologically consistent across the range of 
social and economic issues (ideological coherence).16 Second, members 
have become better sorted by party (partisan sorting).17 The moderate 
Republican and conservative Democratic wings evident through much of 
the twentieth century have largely disappeared.18 Finally, the distance 
between median party preferences has increased in both chambers 
(ideological divergence).19 One measure is the National Journal’s annual ide-
ological rankings: In 1982, 344 members of the House were located 
between the most liberal Republican and the most conservative Democrat; 
by 2013, there were four.20 Fifty-eight senators occupied this space in 1982; 
none in 2013.21 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Voteview, Polarization of Parties, supra note 13. 
 16. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America 1, 
5 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); see also Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, 
supra note 5, at 22–23 (describing “intraparty cleavages on almost all issues”). 
 17. See Marc J. Hetherington, Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 
413, 419–22 (2009) (describing factors contributing to “Big Sort”). 
 18. See id. at 421; see also infra Part II (discussing post–Civil War history of polarization). 
 19. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 415–19, 446. 
 20. Chris Cillizza, The Ideological Middle Is Dead in Congress. Really Dead., Wash. Post: 
The Fix (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/the-
ideological-middle-is-dead-in-congress-really-dead/ [http://perma.cc/6EYV-NVV3] [hereinaf-
ter Cillizza, Ideological Middle]. 
 21. Id. 
 
A. Asymmetricality: Republicans vs. Democrats 
Most researchers conclude that this ideological divergence has been 
asymmetric, with Republicans shifting further from the center than 
Democrats.22 If true, this implies that the future course of congressional 
polarization is particularly tied to actions of the GOP and Republican 
congressional leaders.23 
Evidence of the asymmetry appears in Figures 2A and 2B, in which 
the DW-Nominate data reveal a steeper Republican movement toward 
the extremes beginning in the 1980s. 
                                                                                                                           
 22. E.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, 
and American Democracy, 139–42 (2010) [hereinafter Abramowitz, Disappearing Center]; 
Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 21; McCarty, Polarization Is 
Asymmetric, supra note 14. 
 23. See infra section IV.C (assessing explanations and remedies focused on 
Republican Party). 
 
FIGURE 2A: DW NOMINATE SCORES FOR HOUSE24 
 
FIGURE 2B: DW NOMINATE SCORES FOR SENATE25 
 
Further evidence comes from separating the DW-Nominate data into 
Southern and Northern Democrats. Figures 3A and 3B reveal that most of 
the leftward movement of the Democratic median over time is explained 
by the exodus of white Southern Democrats that began in the Civil Rights 
era. With views on race and some economic issues that were considerably 
more conservative than those of many Republicans, their departure left 
the ideological score of the modern Democratic caucus close to that of 
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Northern Democrats of the 1970s (-0.4).26 Republicans also experienced 
some partisan sorting, as white Southern conservatives entered and more 
liberal, predominantly Eastern “Rockefeller Republicans” disappeared,27 
but the average score of the Republican caucus has shifted substantially 
right, from +0.2 in the 1970s to more than +0.6. 
FIGURE 3A: HOUSE 1879–2014  
PARTY MEANS ON LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION28  
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FIGURE 3B: SENATE 1879–2014  
PARTY MEANS ON LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION29 
 
Yet another measure of asymmetry is the percentage of “non-centrist” 
members (those whose DW-Nominate score is below -0.5 or above +0.5): In 
the House, this describes more than 80% of Republicans and about 10% of 
Democrats; in the Senate, it includes just over 40% of Republicans and 
15% of Democrats.30 
Scholars who disagree that divergence is asymmetrical argue that 
methods other than DW-Nominate for estimating ideological shift show 
more parity between the parties, or even that Democrats have shifted 
further from the center than Republicans.31 This remains a decidedly 
minority view among political scientists, however. 
B. Incumbents vs. Newcomers 
The predominant view is that ideological divergence has been 
driven not by incumbents shifting their ideological position, but rather 
by the influx of new Members—especially Republicans—who are more 
extreme than their predecessors.32 Figure 4 shows this trend. 
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FIGURE 4:DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINUING AND NEWLY 
ELECTED MEMBERS TO THE U.S. HOUSE ON DW-NOMINATE FIRST 
DIMENSION SCORES, 107TH–112TH CONGRESSES33 
 
C. An Alternative, More Complex Picture 
The DW-Nominate data seem to justify dire predictions about 
intractably dysfunctional government: As legislators have become sorted 
with near-perfect accuracy into more ideologically coherent and divergent 
parties, opportunities for coalition building appear to have disappeared. 
However, the work of several scholars challenges the parsimoniousness of 
the standard account. 
One group of challenges directly concerns the DW-Nominate 
methodology. Roll-call vote tabulation does not break down or differentially 
weight votes by importance or ideological content. So, although the data are 
conventionally presented on a liberal/conservative “ideological” scale, what 
is actually being measured is party-line voting.34 Frances Lee’s substantive 
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analysis of more than twenty years of Senate votes confirms that many issues 
on the congressional agenda lack an obvious ideological valence.35 Hence, 
something besides sincere ideological differences drives increased party-line 
voting. This “something,” Professor Lee argues, is “team play” behavior—
the will to win and desire to defeat the other party.36 To be sure, both 
ideology and intense competition for power will lower incentives for 
bipartisan cooperation, but tactics may be more open to reassessment and 
change than ideologically rooted conflict.37 
A different methodological challenge comes from David Bateman, 
Josh Clinton, and John Lapinski, who argue that DW-Nominate’s use of 
“bridge legislators” is insufficient to permit accurate comparisons across 
Congresses “wherever there has been a systematic shift—leftward or 
rightward—in both member preferences and the policy space.”38 Using 
qualitative historical data about the passage of civil rights and Social 
Security legislation to produce adjusted estimates of Members’ ideological 
location over time, they find considerably lower levels of interparty conflict 
than the standard DW-Nominate estimates.39 
A second group of scholars challenges the reductionism of roll-call 
vote tabulation by emphasizing that recorded votes represent only a 
portion of Member activity. These scholars examine multiple measures of 
legislative behavior and productivity over time and paint a far more com-
plex (and positive) picture of congressional functionality. Laurel 
Harbridge’s study of bipartisanship in the House examines behavior before 
and after roll-call voting to find “a latent but remarkably persistent level of 
substantive bipartisan agreement.”40 This agreement is evidenced in part 
by bipartisan co-sponsorship of bills, which declined by less than 20% 
during the twenty-year period when bipartisan roll-call voting was 
declining more than 60%.41 Agenda-setting—the leadership’s manip-
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ulation of which measures get to the floor and result in a recorded vote—
thus obscures the persistence of cross-party alliances and heightens the 
apparent degree of partisan polarization.42 
E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson similarly conclude that 
“[c]onflict in Congress is neither all consuming nor is it the defining 
characteristic of lawmaking.”43 Examining a wide variety of qualitative and 
quantitative data, they conclude that, despite polarization, “legislators do 
engage in problem solving on a routine and sustained basis.”44 David 
Mayhew, whose landmark study of congressional productivity challenged 
conventional wisdom about the negative impact of divided government,45 
more recently assembled a fine-grained dataset on the legislative progress 
of major proposals from Harry Truman to George W. Bush.46 Finding that 
modern presidents of both parties generally get their major proposals 
enacted, he concludes that the constitutional system, in operation over 
time, tends to be majoritarian and self-correcting.47 Each branch eventu-
ally pulls back if it deviates too much from the others, and institutions tend 
to move back toward the median voter.48 
D. The Bottom Line 
Based on the widely used empirical measure, DW-Nominate, 
congressional polarization has been steadily and consistently increasing 
since the 1980s. This trend appears to be driven primarily by the increased 
extremism of Republican (versus Democratic) and new (versus incum-
bent) members. 
These results accord with widespread perceptions of a Congress 
increasingly mired in partisan “tribal warfare,”49 but the DW-Nominate 
method has important limitations. Results are typically presented on a 
liberal/conservative scale even though the underlying roll-call data are not 
limited to votes with an ideological valence. What the analyses actually reveal 
is the extent of party-line voting. This is certainly a measure of partisan 
conflict, but such voting reflects a range of motivations more diverse, and 
potentially more open to negotiation, than ideological commitment. This 
leads to the second limitation. Roll-call voting is crucially important, but it is 
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only one species of congressional behavior. Moreover, it is significantly 
shaped by the leadership’s agenda-setting power, and so can over-predict the 
level of entrenched party conflict relative to other indicators such as co-
sponsored legislation. As Joshua Huder puts it, “Roll call votes are both a 
very good measure of polarization and a clearly biased sample.”50 
Researchers who look at the wider range of Member behaviors do not deny 
that congressional polarization is a real concern, but their work paints a 
more complex picture in which significant bipartisan collaboration 
continues to exist. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
“[T]he truly unusual historical period in US Congressional polarization is the 
period of bipartisanship immediately following the Second World War.” 
~ Han & Brady51 
Political parties are not a new phenomenon in American govern-
ment, and partisan discord is as old as Hamilton’s Federalists and 
Jefferson’s Democratic-Republicans.52 Similarly, although practices around 
the filibuster changed considerably over the twentieth century,53 the 
structural components of lawmaking gridlock have existed for more than 
200 years. Hence, historical patterns of polarization seem relevant to 
understanding, and to predicting the likely permanence of, contem-
porary congressional dysfunction. 
A. How Much Partisan Conflict Is “Normal” for U.S. Politics? 
On its face, the message of history is straightforward and ominous: As 
shown in Figure 1 above, the standard DW-Nominate measure reveals a 
higher level of polarization in both chambers than at any time in the history 
of the two major parties. In the modern post–World War II era, the trend of 
partisan conflict has been disturbingly monotonic and accelerating. 
For some researchers, however, history tells a different story. In this 
account, significant levels of congressional polarization are the norm in 
U.S. politics. Mid-twentieth-century lows are the anomaly, a period when 
partisan conflict was suppressed by politically expedient accommodation 
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of Southern racial repression.54 Political blogger Matthew Yglesias gives a 
more emotive but accurate explication of this reading of the history: 
[I]t really is remarkable that for all the bellyaching about the 
decline of bipartisan behavior in DC there’s very little attention 
paid to the fact that there are actual reasons this has happened 
beyond Newt Gingrich being a meany and bloggers being too 
shrill. The Jim Crow South gave rise to an odd structure of 
American political institutions whereby both of the parties 
contained substantial ideological diversity. This had the benefit 
of setting the stage for a wide array of cross-cutting alliances. It 
came, however, at the cost of consigning a substantial portion of 
the population to life under a brutal system of apartheid 
ruthlessly upheld through systematic violence. 
After that system collapsed, there was a two decade or so 
period during which the voters and parties were re-aligning 
themselves during which we had cross-cutting alliances but no 
apartheid. And now the aligning process is done, so we have two 
parties where essentially all Democrats are to the left of 
essentially all Republicans and so you have relatively few 
genuinely bipartisan coalitions.55 
B. Is Current Polarization Different from Earlier High-Conflict Periods? 
Because neither party competition nor institutional arrangements 
vulnerable to partisan gridlock are new features of American government, 
earlier periods of extreme party conflict may help understand and predict 
the course of contemporary events. The previous high point from 1890 to 
1910, when the country was undergoing major economic transitions and 
debating the U.S. role in a changing international order, seems especially 
relevant. Thomas Carsey and Geoffrey Layman have argued that the 
number of issues dividing today’s parties is uniquely large, leaving few 
crosscutting issues around which new coalitions might form.56 But other 
scholars identify multiple similarities between the present and the 1890 to 
1910 era including, a “resurgence in religious activity,” a “melding of 
moral and economic issues,” and partisan debates “laden with moral 
overtones”;57 party affiliation becoming a “social as well as ideological 
phenomenon”;58 large population shifts within the country and great 
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disparities of wealth;59 close electoral competition such that small voter 
shifts could swing control from one party to the other;60 and a period of 
tight leadership discipline that established a “highly centralized and 
intensely partisan House.”61 
Going back even further, John Aldrich argues that the turn of the 
nineteenth century saw comparably high levels of conflict between 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, as well as familiar patterns that 
included “increased partisan polarization, spreading over new dimen-
sions of politics and policy,” “close electoral parity between the two 
parties,” and ruthless strategic behavior to gain electoral advantage.62 
Mann and Ornstein have emphasized a cultural dimension, which, 
they argue, sets contemporary congressional polarization apart. They 
perceive an unparalleled level of acrimony, intolerance, disrespect of 
established norms of professional behavior, publicly expressed disdain of 
other members and the President, and tactical ruthlessness.63 The emer-
gence of strident niche-oriented radio and cable channels helps fuel 
partisan antipathy.64 However, Professors Brady and Han point to eras 
when members settled debates with physical assaults and “the aptly named 
sergeant at arms” removed weapons from arriving representatives,65 while 
Kerwin Swint has documented that vituperation and scurrilous public 
attacks on the opposition date back at least to 1800 and the presidential 
contest between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.66 Moreover, 
newspapers in the nineteenth century were notoriously partisan vehicles 
that blithely sacrificed factual accuracy and objective reporting in order to 
“‘convert the doubters, recover the wavering, and hold the committed.’”67 
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In sum, although current levels of partisan misbehavior and media 
manipulation are undoubtedly high, they may not be historical anomalies. 
C. The Bottom Line 
The inquiry into history follows what is becoming a familiar theme: A 
seemingly straightforward and discouraging answer becomes, on deeper 
examination, far more nuanced and less relentlessly pessimistic. The 
current level of congressional polarization is the highest since the Civil 
War. However, the frame of reference for judging “normal” levels of 
partisan conflict is skewed by an era of bipartisan harmony purchased with 
racial appeasement. Polarization levels have demonstrably varied over 
time. There is no clear political science consensus on whether the present 
era is truly exceptional or instead has parallels with earlier periods of 
heightened congressional polarization—particularly the previous high 
point from 1890 to 1910—that did eventually abate. 
III. CAN CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION BE EXPLAINED BY POLARIZATION 
IN THE ELECTORATE? 
“For a few years I’ve been fascinated by the idea that, in American politics, the 
perception of polarization is larger than polarization itself.” 
~Andrew Gelman68 
Acknowledging the role of the Civil Rights movement in ending 
an era of (artificially) low polarization does not explain why partisan 
conflict in Congress has continued to increase steadily in the 
intervening decades. The most obvious hypothesis would be that 
Congress has become more polarized because the electorate has be-
come more polarized. This Part begins by looking at two competing 
portraits of voting-eligible adults, both of which are drawn from a 
large recent national survey of political attitudes. Then it describes 
the similarly conflicted views of political scientists. 
A. Two Hostile Camps or Many Cross-Pressured Clusters? The Pew Polarization 
Study 
In June 2014, the Pew Research Center released a much-anticipated 
report based on one of the largest studies of political attitudes outside 
the long-running American National Election Studies (ANES).69 Pew’s 
survey capped a period that epitomized polarized congressional politics: 
budget sequestration, months of dancing at the edge of the fiscal cliff, 
and the lingering death of immigration reform. So it was no surprise 
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when the report—dismally titled Political Polarization in the American 
Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect 
Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life 70—described a citizenry that 
mirrored all the dimensions of congressional polarization: 
 “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along 
ideological lines—and partisan antipathy is deeper and more 
extensive—than at any point in the last two decades. These 
trends manifest themselves in myriad ways, both in politics and 
in everyday life.”71 
 “In each party, the share with a highly negative view of the 
opposing party has more than doubled since 1994. Most of these 
intense partisans believe the opposing party’s policies ‘are so 
misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being.’”72 
 “People with down-the-line ideological positions—especially 
conservatives—are more likely than others to say that most of 
their close friends share their political views. Liberals and 
conservatives disagree over where they want to live, the kind of 
people they want to live around and even whom they would 
welcome into their families.”73 
 “[A]t a time of increasing gridlock on Capitol Hill, many on 
both the left and the right think the outcome of political 
negotiations between Obama and Republican leaders should be 
that their side gets more of what it wants.”74 
Only by persevering to the end of this negative account could a 
reader discover that the situation was perhaps not nearly so dire: 
These sentiments are not shared by all—or even most—
Americans. The majority do not have uniformly conservative or 
liberal views. Most do not see either party as a threat to the 
nation. And more believe their representatives in government 
should meet halfway to resolve contentious disputes rather than 
hold out for more of what they want.75 
The topline bullet points of the report got considerable coverage in 
news reports and political blogs; the qualifying language that provided 
context was rarely picked up.76 
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Two weeks later, Pew released a second report—Beyond Red vs. Blue: 
The Political Typology—Fragmented Center Poses Election Challenges for Both 
Parties77—analyzing additional data gathered in the same survey. This 
report, which got little coverage even on Pew’s own blog, offered a very 
different framing: 
Partisan polarization—the vast and growing gap between 
Republicans and Democrats—is a defining feature of politics 
today. But beyond the ideological wings, which make up a 
minority of the public, the political landscape includes a center 
that is large and diverse, unified by frustration with politics and 
little else. As a result, both parties face formidable challenges in 
reaching beyond their bases to appeal to the middle of the 
electorate and build sustainable coalitions.78 
This second report was based on analyses that used responses to 
twenty-three questions about political attitudes and values to cluster 
respondents into cohesive groups. It specifically addressed the 
methodological differences with the earlier report: 
[A] significant limitation of the ideological scale used in the 
[first] polarization report is that it treats political ideology as a 
single left-right scale. This approach is valuable in terms of 
tracking levels of ideological consistency over time, but it does a 
poor job of describing the political “center” other than that they 
don’t hold consistently liberal or consistently conservative views.79 
The result of the cluster analysis, reproduced in Table 1, is a 
complex and nuanced picture in which a solid majority of voters (and a 
sizeable plurality of the “politically engaged”) are what political scientists 
term “cross-pressured80:” holding a mix of liberal and conservative views, 
they are not well-represented by either party.81 
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The bipolar framing of the two Pew reports parallels a vehement 
political science debate about the nature and extent of polarization in 
the electorate—a debate considered next. 
B. Polarization in the Electorate: The Political Science Debate 
When it comes to assessing the existence and strength of polar-
ization in the electorate, one of the few areas on which political scientists 
agree is that the answer depends very much on the type of voter being 
considered. In descending order of clear evidence of polarization, three 
groups can be distinguished: activists, party identifiers, and everyone else. 
1. Activists. — There is general agreement that party activists as a 
group tend to be even more well-sorted by party and more ideologically 
coherent and ideologically divergent than Congress itself.83 They are, in other 
words, highly polarized. 
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2. Party Identifiers. — Citizens who self-identify as Republicans or 
Democrats have become more ideologically coherent across the range of 
social and economic issues and more well-sorted into the “appropriate” 
party.84 Still, researchers have found that two-thirds of even strong 
partisans disagree with their party on at least one issue they consider 
personally important.85 An illustration drawn from the Pew cluster analysis 
is the “Business Conservatives” cluster: individuals who predominantly 
identify with the Republican Party and share the party’s pro-business, anti-
regulatory platform, but who tend to be pro-immigration and less aligned 
with the party’s social conservatism on such issues as gay rights.86 
With respect to ideological divergence, party identifiers have probably 
moved further from the center, although this is far less well-established,87 
and their divergence is certainly not as extreme as among party activists88 
or legislators.89 There is a methodological problem here, in that measures 
of citizens’ ideological consistency are often used to infer that Republicans 
and Democrats “are further apart.”90 Questions used to index ideology 
often present dichotomous choices, even though many people would not 
place themselves 100% on one side or the other. For example, one Pew 
ideological index question asked respondents to pick the “statement [that] 
comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right”: “The best 
way to ensure peace is through military strength” (scored conservative) or 
“Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace” (scored liberal).91 A 
moderate Democrat who on balance preferred diplomacy but felt that 
military strength was also important would answer the question in the 
same way as a radical pacifist. Hence, over a set of ideologically consistent 
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 85. Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 62; see also Jeremy C. 
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Beliefs, 10 Forum, no. 3, art. 5, 2012, at 8–10 (finding 30–40% of strong party affiliates and 
approximately 50% of weak party affiliates disagree with party on at least one issue). 
 86. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 19, 101. 
 87. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 25–26; 
Hetherington, supra note 17, at 446. 
 88. See Layman et al., supra note 83, at 340–41; Layman, Carsey & Horowitz, supra 
note 84, at 96–97. 
 89. See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and 
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Roll Calls in the 106th House, 68 J. Pol. 397, 406–07 (2006). 
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 91. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 82, 103, 105–06. 
 
responses, this method tends to amplify the apparent distance between 
Democratic and Republican respondents.92 
Party identifiers do increasingly evidence cultural dimensions of 
polarization. Compared to a generation ago, more now say that they have 
negative feelings about members of the other party,93 would be 
uncomfortable with their child marrying someone identified with the 
opposite party,94 and prefer having friends from and living near those of 
their own party.95 Republican-identifiers are somewhat more likely to express 
these views than Democrat-identifiers.96 
Party identifiers disproportionately affect electoral outcomes because 
they are more likely to vote in primary and general elections as well as 
contribute to and volunteer for political campaigns.97 Beyond agreeing on 
this fact, however, political scientists passionately dispute the size and impact 
of this group as compared to the rest of the electorate.98 Emblematic of one 
camp is Alan Abramowitz, whose book The Disappearing Center: Engaged 
Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy argues that engaged and 
polarized party identifiers are a large, important, and growing segment of 
voters.99 Morris Fiorina, whose book Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized 
America insists that ideologically coherent and divergent partisanship 
remains the exception within the electorate, epitomizes the other camp.100 
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& Lelkes, supra note 93, at 418. 
 97. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 72–73; see also Abramowitz, 
Disappearing Center, supra note 22, 86–89 (noting greater voter turnout among strong 
partisans); supra Table 1 (showing greater political engagement among “partisan anchors” 
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 98. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 431. 
 99. Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 34–61, 169–72; accord Gary C. 
Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 Presidential 
Stud. Q. 688, 691–700 (2013) [hereinafter Jacobson, Partisan Polarization]. 
 100. Morris P. Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, at xiii, xv 
(3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Fiorina et al., Culture War?]. 
 
3. Everyone Else (“The Center” or “The Middle”). — The state of 
polarization among the rest of the electorate is difficult to assess and 
highly disputed. Specific evidence is reviewed below, but the overall 
picture appears to be as follows. Compared to activists and party 
identifiers, most citizens are not particularly well sorted by partisan 
identity101 and do not hold ideologically coherent views102—at least so long as 
“coherence” is defined by reference to the conceptions of liberalism and 
conservatism embodied in the current Democratic and Republican party 
platforms.103 Instead, the common pattern is for individuals to hold a mix 
of liberal and conservative preferences that makes neither party a good 
ideological fit. In terms of ideological divergence, this large group is 
sometimes called “the center” or “the middle”104—implying an ideological 
location between the two party extremes—but it is probably incorrect to 
attribute uniformly moderate preferences to this diverse range of 
citizens.105 In general, this group is less politically engaged than the other 
two groups although, as the Pew survey data show, it spans a huge range 
from politically active to completely apathetic.106 
a. Partisan Sorting. — With respect to partisan sorting, Table 2 
summarizes the latest ANES data on how voting-eligible adults identify 
their party affiliation. 
TABLE 2: U.S. PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2012 107 
                                                                                                                           
 101. See infra section III.B.3.a. 
 102. See infra section III.B.3.b. 
 103. See infra section III.B.3.c. 
 104. E.g., Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 15; Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel 
Abrams, Americans Are Not Polarized, Just Better Sorted, in Political Polarization in 
American Politics, supra note 34, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Fiorina & Abrams, Americans Not 
Polarized]; Andrew Kohut, The Political Middle Still Matters, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank 
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/01/the-political-middle-
still-matters/ [http://perma.cc/ZM3S-R4YW]. 
 105. See infra notes 130–133 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra Table 1 (showing less political engagement among “less partisan” 
groups than partisan groups). 
 107. Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80. 
Strong Democrat 20% 
Weak Democrat 15% 
Independent-leaning Democrat 12% 
Pure Independent 14% 
Independent-leaning Republican 12% 
Weak Republican 12% 
Strong Republican 15% 
 
In follow-up surveys, “strong” party identifiers virtually always remain 
consistent in their declared party affiliation, and “weak” identifiers 
overwhelmingly do so.108 The much-debated enigma is the 38% who self-
identify as pure and “leaning” Independents. The proportionate share of 
these groups started to increase in the early 1970s.109 In recent Gallup 
polling, a record 43% of respondents self-identified as Independent.110 
Many political scientists are skeptical about Independents, especially 
the leaners. According to the classic treatment, “[Leaners] are never 
neutral, and the extent of their affect almost invariably resembles that of 
weak partisans.”111 Scholars who perceive more polarization in the electorate 
describe Independents (particularly leaners) as “closet partisans” who dislike 
being labeled Republican or Democrat but consistently support only one 
party’s candidate.112 Scholars who perceive less polarization in the electorate 
counter that even leaners are more likely to support third-party candidates 
and are less consistent in their self-reported partisan identification over 
time.113 Indeed, Professor Fiorina argues that skepticism about 
Independents rests on an unresolved methodological problem of cause and 
effect: “[T]he tendency of leaning independents to vote for the party toward 
which they lean may indicate that they use their voting intention to answer 
the directional probe. That is, ‘I’m going to vote for Obama, so I guess I lean 
to the Democrats.’”114 
Whichever side has the better of this argument, polls consistently 
show that the majority of Americans express an unfavorable view of both 
the Republican and the Democratic parties.115 Indeed, as just noted, a 
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(describing results of 2008 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems poll); Sarah Dutton et al., 
Americans’ Views of Obama, Congress, Political Parties: Gloomy, CBS News (Aug. 6, 2014, 6:30 
 
key element of the skeptical view of Independents is the assumption that 
these voters do not want to express affiliation with either party. This in 
itself clearly distinguishes them from both activists and party identifiers, 
for whom partisan affiliation is a strong component of identity that fuels 
ideological coherence and divergence.116 
b. Ideological Coherence. — To suggest that political opinions within the 
electorate generally (mass opinion) are becoming consistently liberal or 
conservative flouts a bedrock political science principle that most 
Americans are “innocent of ‘ideology.’”117 Nevertheless, Professor 
Abramowitz makes a variant of this argument in The Disappearing Center. 
He theorizes that people become more politically engaged and ideo-
logically consistent as they become better educated (even if many prefer to 
self-identify as Independent).118 Hence, as education levels within the 
electorate rise, so does the prevalence of voters with consistently liberal or 
conservative views.119 Correlatively, he argues, people whose opinions 
remain in the middle of the libera/conservative spectrum are dispropor-
tionately the politically uninformed and disengaged.120 The “center” is 
disappearing, Professor Abramowitz believes, because it is increasingly 
occupied by the least electorally relevant citizens. 
Unsurprisingly, other scholars dispute this picture of growing 
ideological coherence in mass opinion.121 Analyzing responses to ANES 
policy questions over time, Jeremy Pope found that weak party identifiers 
and leaners frequently defect from the party line in their issue 
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positions.122 He concludes, “[T]here is nothing wrong with the idea that 
leaners often look very much like the weak partisans in their attitudes. 
The problem is that the parties in the electorate do not have nearly the 
policy coherence necessary to think of them as unified camps.”123 This 
conclusion aligns with survey reports that a substantial proportion of 
Americans believe neither major party well represents their views.124 
c. Ideological Divergence. — Perhaps the most interesting part of the 
debate about polarization in the electorate is whether citizens in the 
large, amorphous “middle” in fact generally hold moderate, centrist 
views or, instead, are becoming more extreme in their issue positions. To 
some degree, disagreement on this point reflects differing character-
izations of the same evidence.125 More fundamentally, the method-
ological problem of using measures of coherence to infer divergence 
reappears here. The previous discussion pointed out how cumulating 
dichotomous answers in order to construct liberal/conservative ideology 
scales will overstate the apparent extremism of ideologically consistent 
respondents.126 The reverse effect—masking extremism as apparent 
moderation—occurs when ideologically inconsistent answers (as judged by 
prevailing liberal/conservative ideological conceptions) are averaged. 
For example, a right-wing populist who selects the Republican answer on 
immigration because he believes in deporting all illegal immigrants and 
the Democratic answer on business regulation because he distrusts Wall 
Street will fall in the center of the distribution—as will a committed 
libertarian who chooses the Republican answer on business regulation 
and the Democratic answer on abortion because she believes govern-
ment should stay out of both areas.127 
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Using methods deliberately designed to measure divergence, Hill 
and Tausanovitch conclude that “Americans tend to be no more distant 
from one another today than they were in the 1950s,” even on social 
issues often thought to be driving polarization.128 This is not the same as 
saying that the middle is “a mass of principled centrists.”129 In The 
Persuadable Voter, Hillygus and Shields find that the electorate “is not 
simply moderate across policy issues; it holds heterogeneous policy 
preferences” that candidates can use to build winning coalitions.130 
Moreover, heterogeneity is not the same as chaos. Voters “do often hold 
true and meaningful policy preferences”131—even if prevailing 
liberal/conservative conceptions cannot predict what those preferences 
will be.132 Consider, for example, the four clusters of citizens, revealed in 
the Pew analysis, who are not party-identifiers:133 
 “Faith and Family Left” :  Predominantly non-white and older, they 
“support activist government and a strong social safety net,” but their 
deep religious convictions diverge from the Democratic party line on 
social issues like same sex marriage. Roughly half hold an equal mix of 
liberal and conservative values.134 
 “Hard-Pressed Skeptics” :  Battered by the economic downturn and 
the poorest of any group, they deeply resent both government and 
business. Although critical of government performance, they strongly 
support increased social spending but hold more conservative views on 
issues such as homosexuality and are less likely to approve of the 
Affordable Care Act. Two-thirds express an equal number of liberal and 
conservative positions.135 
 “Young Outsiders” :  Younger and more ethnically diverse than 
Republicans, they share a deep opposition to increased government 
spending on social programs but tend to be liberal on social issues such 
as homosexuality, secular in religious orientation, and generally open to 
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immigration. Seventy percent take an equal mix of liberal and conser-
vative positions.136 
 “Next Generation Left”: The other principal cluster of young 
voters, they have liberal views on social issues, but are more positive 
about Wall Street and wary of the social safety net because of its costs. 
Just over 40% take an equal number of liberal and conservative 
positions.137 
All these clusters are heavily cross-pressured, comprising voters who 
“genuinely support[] liberal policies in some domains and conservative 
policies in others,”138 although the nature and direction of the pressures 
are quite different for each cluster. Together, they total 57% of registered 
voters and more than 40% of “politically engaged” citizens139—giving rise 
to the subtitle of the Pew report, Fragmented Center Poses Election Challenges 
for Both Parties. 
Finally, the diverse and fragmented middle does not exhibit the 
cultural polarization of strong party-identifiers. Overall, substantially 
more people say they prefer elected officials who make compromises to 
those “who stick to their positions.”140 The pro-compromise position is 
even stronger in younger subgroups.141 Finally, the overwhelming major-
ity report little concern about living where most people share their 
political views, having family members marry within their party, or having 
most of their close friends share their political views.142 
C. The Bottom Line 
Congressional polarization is not mirrored by polarization in the 
electorate generally. Most citizens appear to hold a mix of liberal and 
conservative preferences. This cross-pressured state is reflected in polls 
expressing a negative opinion of both parties and a belief that neither 
party well-represents their views. More evidence of polarization appears 
in subgroups of the electorate whose influence on the political process is 
disproportionate to their numbers. In particular, activists are at least as 
polarized as Congress. Those who strongly self-identify with one or the 
other party have more characteristics of polarization than the majority of 
citizens, and there are signs that this subgroup is becoming more 
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polarized. Still, even most partisans disagree with their party on at least 
one issue of importance to them. 
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
“[M]ore than most people we realize how little we genuinely know about the 
operation of complex political processes and institutions, and, consequently, how 
likely it is that proposed reforms will prove ineffectual or, worse, counterproductive.” 
~Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 143 
Because the most obvious explanatory hypothesis for congressional 
polarization—legislators are simply representing the highly polarized 
preferences of their constituency—is not supported by the evidence, 
other kinds of explanations have been proffered. Many of these are 
plausible hypotheses, but the actual evidential support is slim, 
particularly given how fundamental and controversial the accompanying 
remedial proposals tend to be. Moreover, some of the most vigorously 
argued explanations, and associated proposed cures, are in direct 
conflict. At least so far, no smoking gun has been discovered that 
convincingly accounts for rising congressional polarization in recent 
decades or supports the prediction that legislative gridlock is likely to be 
intractably entrenched. 
A. Explanations Focused on Distortion of Electoral Outcomes 
If current levels of congressional polarization do not reflect 
preferences of the electorate, a logical hypothesis is that some aspect of 
the electoral process is producing unrepresentative representatives. 
Gerrymandering, use of primaries for candidate selection, and campaign 
financing are the prime targets of attention and proposed reform. 
Gerrymandering is a venerable American tradition.144 Although it is 
conceivable that today’s state legislatures are just more adept at partisan 
manipulation than all their predecessors, the more plausible account 
focuses on technological advances: New methods of gathering and 
analyzing information now enable highly accurate micro-mapping of 
residential patterns that makes partisan line-drawing far more effective.145 
Still, researchers generally reject the gerrymandering explanation.146 For 
one thing, partisan redistricting cannot explain polarization in the 
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Senate147 or in House delegations from low-population states with a 
single, at-large district.148 Moreover, representatives from competitive 
districts (that is, districts with a mix of registered Republicans and 
Democrats) do not have more moderate roll-call voting records than 
those from extremely partisan districts.149 Finally, simulations of expected 
partisanship of representatives from randomly generated districts 
produce results almost as polarized as the actual Congress.150 
Even more disconcerting than the research that fails to support the 
gerrymandering hypothesis are recent studies finding that legislators 
from districts with a heterogeneous mix of Republican and Democratic 
voters tend to have more extreme roll-call voting records than those from 
homogenous districts.151 One proposed explanation is that heterogeneity 
creates greater electoral uncertainty, which allows more extreme 
candidates to pursue policy goals that diverge from median voter 
preferences in pursuit of the support of more engaged and ideological 
voters.152 Whether or not this explanation is accurate, the evidence 
suggests that districting reform in the direction of creating more 
competitive districts could actually do more harm than good.153 
The second area of focus, primaries, rests on the observation that 
primary turnout is reliably lower than turnout in the general election 
and the standard wisdom that this exaggerates the voice of activists and 
strong partisans who favor more extreme candidates than the median 
voter would prefer.154 The commonly used closed primary—in which 
voting is limited to registered party members—is a relatively recent 
method of selecting who will represent the party in the general 
election.155 Hence, some reformers propose moving to open or top-two 
primaries in order to expand the pool of voters who select 
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candidates156—or even abolishing primaries altogether in favor of 
ranked-voting, instant runoff elections.157 Some studies do link open 
primaries with more moderate candidates,158 but recent empirical work 
finds little effect on legislative polarization from the type of primary.159 
Mandatory voting is a more extreme proposal for expanding the group 
of voters who select representatives.160 Formal modeling provides some 
support for thinking that substantially increased turnout would shift 
candidate positions toward the median voter,161 but many commenters warn 
of the unpredictable, and possibly unintended, consequences of so funda-
mental a change in American elections162—a concern that is hardly fanciful 
in light of recent findings on the surprisingly counterproductive results, 
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discussed above, of creating heterogeneous congressional districts163 or of 
implementing some popular campaign finance reforms, discussed next.164 
The third focus, campaign financing, is a plausible contributor to 
polarization because it also has changed over time.165 However, the 
empirical evidence here actually contradicts some of the most advocated 
reform proposals. For example, it appears that partial public funding can 
actually increase polarization, apparently by disproportionately decreasing 
contributions from “access-oriented” interest groups.166 These are groups, 
predominantly industry and trade associations, who care about access to 
whomever holds the office, in contrast to issue-oriented groups, who care 
about supporting candidates aligned with the group’s substantive 
preferences or ideology.167 Because access-oriented groups seek to invest in 
longevity in office, they tend to support incumbents over challengers, and 
more moderate over more extreme candidates.168 Full public funding 
removes this effect, but so far has not reduced polarization in the states 
that have implemented it.169 
With respect to private funding, researchers have not found that 
corporate political action committees (PACs) drive polarization; such 
donors tend to be access-oriented rather than ideologically oriented and to 
hedge their bets by spreading funding around.170 Individual donors, by 
contrast, are generally more ideological than both PACs and the median 
voter; moreover, they tend to be less concerned with a candidate’s 
electability.171 Recent research on state legislators suggests that the most 
widely advocated campaign financing reform—restricting PAC contri-
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butions while encouraging individual contributions—can actually increase 
legislative polarization.172 
In sum, although electoral-process reforms are widely advocated as 
remedies, there is little hard evidence that gerrymandering, primaries, or 
existing campaign financing practices are the causal agents driving 
contemporary congressional polarization. This is probably good news, 
given the formidable legal and institutional obstacles to large-scale 
national reform in these areas. 
B. Explanations Focused on Party Power and Control 
Another set of proposed explanations for congressional polarization 
focuses on the parties. However, these explanations run in opposite 
directions: Some researchers insist that polarization has increased 
because the parties are too weak (pro-party theorists), while others as 
vehemently identify the problem as too much party power and control 
(anti-party theorists). 
In Anthony Downs’s classic model of party behavior, parties have 
strong incentives to converge to the median voter.173 A small group of 
scholars has recently argued that the Republican and Democratic parties 
have become too weak to function as Downsian parties.174 Historically, 
candidate selection was controlled by local party organizations that were 
hierarchical, long-standing, and largely autonomous from outside 
interests: They set platforms, ran campaigns, allocated patronage and 
other resources, and turned out voters.175 Over the course of the 
twentieth century, a series of changes “democratized” party decision-
making.176 In this transformation, the argument goes, power shifted from 
party leaders who could screen out extremist candidates to ideologically 
driven “outsiders” who fuel polarized politics.177 Pro-party theorists point 
to evidence that states with a history of strong traditional party organ-
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izations have less polarized legislatures than weak-party states.178 They 
therefore advocate strengthening party leadership through: campaign 
finance reform that shifts public and private money from individual 
candidates to parties;179 abolishing primaries in favor of candidate 
selection by the party,180 or at least enhancing the role of parties in 
primaries through such measures as vetting who can use the party label 
on the ballot or allowing an official party ballot endorsement;181 moving 
to party-based proportional representation for legislative districts;182 and 
reviving tools of leadership leverage such as earmarks.183 
Many of these pro-party proposals run directly contrary to the 
“conventional” set of electoral process reforms discussed above,184 and pro-
party advocates defend their approach in part by pointing to the lack of 
evidence that the conventionally advocated reforms will actually lower 
polarization.185 However, there is equally little empirical basis for 
predicting that pro-party proposals would have the desired effect. What 
can be said is that they would reverse the direction of twentieth-century 
political reforms. During the previous polarization highpoint, from 1890 
to 1910, political machines and other species of traditional party organ-
ization flourished,186 and leadership in the House was consolidated under 
Speakers legendary for their iron control over the agenda and the 
Members.187 Progressive reformers championed systems of direct election, 
leading to widespread state adoption of party primaries in the first decades 
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of the twentieth century188 and passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 
1913. Democratization occurred within Congress as well, when Member 
revolt replaced centralized majority-party control with committee govern-
ment rooted in seniority189—a development some research suggests 
contributed to reversing the polarization of the 1890 to 1910 period.190 
The pro-party view stands in sharp contrast to the more common view 
that congressional polarization has been fueled by too much party power. 
The historic Republican takeover of Congress in the November 1994 
midterm elections was followed by changes in organization and procedure 
that once again strengthened the leadership’s control—particularly in the 
House, where polarization is most acute.191 These changes enable the 
leadership to use agenda control to minimize defections, refuse to allow 
bills with bipartisan support to come to the floor, and restrict amendments 
that might moderate proposed legislation.192 The increasing practice of 
bundling bills into omnibus legislation also minimizes Members’ ability to 
support the leadership on some issues and not others.193 The combination 
of agenda manipulation and Member discipline produces a roll-call voting 
record that amplifies partisan differences.194 
Anti-party proponents support the conventional electoral process 
reforms195 that reduce party influence in districting and candidate 
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selection.196 To directly address behavior within Congress, they advocate 
changes in organization and procedure—such as modification of Senate 
filibuster rules or bipartisan election of the Speaker of the House197—
that would concededly require considerable Member self-discipline. 
More broadly, anti-party proponents argue for both intra-party and 
external public pressure to change what is perceived to be a toxic party 
culture198—an issue considered in the next subsection. 
In the end, these two diametrically opposed theories epitomize the 
difficulty of diagnosing the causes of such a complex phenomenon as 
congressional polarization and prescribing a cure that will reliably make 
things better rather than worse. Strong-party theorists rely heavily on the 
Downsian model to predict that party leaders, given enough power, will 
pull their parties and their parties’ congressional caucuses back from the 
extremes. To be sure, leadership power can be exercised to facilitate 
action by what Russell Muirhead has called the “latent majority” in 
Congress.199 This recently occurred when House Speaker John Boehner 
publicly (and controversially) disciplined ultra-conservative members of 
his own party for procedural maneuverings that would have derailed the 
bipartisan deal on fast-track authority in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations.200 But anti-party theorists have many counterexamples, and 
so far there has been no effort at rigorous empirical analysis of the extent 
and impact of strong party leadership behaviors.201 Also on the anti-party 
side is the historical observation that the 1890 to 1910 period of high 
polarization was a highpoint of leadership dominance. 
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C. Explanations Focused on Party Culture and Responses to Electoral Parity 
A third group of explanations also emphasizes the parties but instead of 
focusing on the degree of power and control exercised by party leadership, 
these explanations try to account directly for the rise in conflictual, 
hyperpartisan behavior by leaders and members alike. One of these 
explanations concentrates specifically on Republican Party culture because 
roll-call measures of congressional polarization show Republican members 
asymmetrically moving further toward the extremes than congressional 
Democrats.202 The other explanation implicates the behavior of both parties 
by focusing on the close electoral margins that produce rapid fluctuations in 
party control of the House, the Senate, and the presidency. 
Given the observation of asymmetry, it makes sense to ask why 
Republicans disproportionately would engage in partisan gridlock-
causing behavior. In the late 1990s, Richard Fenno argued that 
Republicans, who gained control of Congress in the 1994 midterm 
elections after forty years as the minority party in the House, needed to 
learn how to govern within a Madisonian institution.203 After two govern-
ment shutdowns that voters largely blamed on them, Speaker Newt 
Gingrich realized the need for compromise, and the House worked with 
President Clinton to produce major legislation on welfare reform, 
balancing the budget, and lowering taxes.204 More recently, some re-
searchers have argued that newer Republican legislators, particularly 
senators who postdate the Gingrich era, must learn these lessons again.205 
A darker assessment sees the Republican Party as deliberately positioning 
itself as an “insurgent outlier in American politics.”206 Openly scornful of 
opposition positions and often vituperative about opponents, 
congressional Republicans do not follow what one longtime Republican 
staffer terms the “unwritten rules, customs and courtesies that lubricate 
the legislative machinery and keep governance a relatively civilized pro-
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cedure.”207 As early as Speaker Gingrich’s election as Speaker in 1994, 
anti-Washington sentiment led the Republican leadership to decrease the 
length of the congressional workweek and encourage members to spend 
more time in their districts.208 Now, fewer members set up family 
residences in D.C., decreasing social interactions across party lines209—
interactions needed to forge networks that facilitate coalition building 
and compromise.210 Fueling this culture, some argue, is a highly partisan 
and intemperate ultraconservative media that is as quick to excoriate 
perceived defectors as to attack the opposition.211 
A different kind of explanation for hyperpolarized Member behavior 
does not require assigning particular blame to Republicans. Rather, it 
focuses on the behavioral incentives created by the constitutional system of 
separated and shared powers when neither party has a clear electoral 
advantage. So long as one party has a reliable but not filibuster, or veto-
proof, majority, both parties have incentives to compromise. This was the 
situation during the mid-portion of the twentieth century, when Democrats 
had seemingly unchallengable control of the House.212 Beginning in the 
1980s, however, neither party has been able to rely on a large electoral 
advantage.213 Instead, both parties have repeatedly gained, and lost, 
control of the Senate, the House, and the presidency.214 In such conditions 
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of electoral parity—when a relatively small shift of voters can swing control 
from one party to the other—incentives push toward behavior that Lee 
calls “competitive team play”215 and Sean Theriault dubs “partisan 
warfare.”216 Rather than compromise and accommodation, members of 
both parties are motivated to engage in scorched-earth tactics intended 
not merely to stymie the other side, even on noncontroversial issues, but 
also to brand the opposition as incompetent, corrupt, or evil.217 The 
electoral parity explanation for polarization is especially intriguing because 
the same condition existed in the 1890 to 1910 era.218 
In the end, both the Republican-specific explanation and the electoral-
parity explanation implicate the potentially significant difference, noted 
earlier,219 between behavior rooted in ideology and behavior rooted in 
strategy. Republican members who sincerely believe that highly public 
failures of federal institutions and programs ultimately serve America’s 
interests pose a different kind of challenge for abating polarization than 
Republicans who believe that such failures strategically advantage the party 
branding itself as anti-Washington/big-government.220 To be sure, team 
affiliation can be a powerful psychological driver of aggressive, oppositional 
behavior, but the whole point of win-at-any-cost behavior is for the team to 
win. Polarization extreme enough to induce congressional gridlock may 
prove not to be a winning strategy for the parties over time. The Pew study 
revealed a majority of Americans saying they want political leaders to 
compromise rather than hold out for their position.221 Matthew Levendusky 
and Neil Malhoutra found that media coverage that exaggerates the degree 
of polarization causes all but the strongest partisans to perceive a violation of 
broadbased norms of moderation, compromise, and civility and to moderate 
their own issue positions in reaction.222 Andrew Hall recently showed that, at 
least in genuinely contested House primaries, nominating an extreme 
candidate substantially decreases the party’s chances of winning the seat in 
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the general election.223 Professor Fiorina has argued that periods of unified 
government have been so brief in recent times because the party in power 
governs as if it had been given an extreme ideological mandate and triggers 
a voter backlash.224 
To be sure, recognizing a counterproductive strategy is not reliably a 
quick or straightforward process.225 Still, history suggests that parties do 
adapt when sufficiently pressured. The 1890 to 1910 period of high 
polarization was resolved through a series of incremental electoral shifts 
that saw the Populist faction first gain control of the Democratic Party and 
then lose it over a series of electoral defeats—which finally caused the 
party to shift its policy positions.226 What seems key to this dynamic is a 
series of losses at the polls that cause infighting, and redefinition, within 
the losing party.227 
D. The Role of Demographics 
Although most political scientists agree that polarization in the 
legislature cannot be accounted for by polarization in the broader 
electorate,228 some argue that there is a relationship between certain 
general demographic trends—number of immigrants and gap between 
the wealthiest and poorest citizens; geographical segregation; and 
education level—and rising congressional polarization. Beyond these 
arguments, certain other demographic trends—particularly age and 
ethnicity—are important potential sources of pressure on the parties to 
adjust their current ideological platforms. 
Some political scientists point to a strong correlation (graphed at 
Appendix A) between polarization trends in the House and both income 
inequality and the percentage of foreign-born noncitizens in the pop-
ulation.229 Of course, correlation does not necessarily imply causation, 
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and these researchers openly acknowledge that cause and effect are hard 
to disentangle.230 According to their argument, high-income citizens and 
low-income citizens tend to support politicians with opposing views on 
redistribution,231 thus contributing to polarization; at the same time, 
polarization-induced legislative gridlock increases income inequality by, 
for example, preventing cost-of-living adjustment to social programs.232 
The rising number of legal and illegal immigrants fuels this dynamic by 
swelling the ranks of the poorest residents. The resulting relative 
improvement in income of the median voter further reduces electoral 
pressure for wealth redistribution, which would be shared with the non-
citizen poor.233 The ultimate position of these scholars seems to be that 
polarization and the gap between rich and poor (including immigrants) 
are mutually reinforcing trends. This assessment has not produced direct 
proposals for change, although the most extended version of the 
argument implies a connection between restricting immigration and 
lowering polarization: It observes that the 1890 to 1910 previous high 
point of polarization saw repeated efforts to restrict immigration that 
finally succeeded in the 1920s, and that liberal immigration laws 
reappeared in the mid–1960s and “prevailed for the rest of the 
century.”234 
The geographical segregation argument is most famously made in 
The Big Sort, a 2008 book by journalist Bill Bishop arguing that since the 
mid–1970s, Americans have increasingly chosen to live in politically like-
minded communities.235 This homogeneity creates an echo chamber in 
which beliefs are reinforced and amplified, fueling polarization.236 
Although the book was widely discussed and recommended by notables 
including former President Clinton,237 the political scientist reaction was 
skeptical. Both the book’s methodology and Bishop’s interpretation were 
questioned, with researchers generally concluding that geographical 
segregation was far less extensive and significant than suggested.238 The 
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most recent empirical work finds that some geographical sorting has 
occurred, but that it is a much more recent phenomenon than Bishop 
claims.239 Moreover, most sorting occurs in the South and appears to be 
the legacy of the partisan realignment of voters rather than migration.240 
Sorting in other regions is more explained by voter mobility, although 
researchers are quick to disclaim the contention that people are 
intentionally picking their neighborhood based on its partisan 
makeup.241 Of course, the echo-chamber effect could occur even if 
geographical homogeneity results from lifestyle preferences (e.g., 
conservatives tending to prefer rural and other exurban areas and 
liberals tending to value urban amenities). The Pew 2014 study found 
evidence of such differences among consistent liberals and consistent 
conservatives, although it also found that “[t]he preferences of less 
ideological Americans are more varied.”242 Moreover, there is evidence 
that the most rapidly growing suburban counties are becoming more 
heterogenous as minorities (especially Latinos) move to areas of 
expanding employment opportunity.243 
Rising education levels is another demographic trend that has drawn 
attention, with some researchers making a causal claim that higher 
education makes liberals more liberal and conservatives more 
conservative.244 Some even go so far as to link education with biology 
through “assortative mating”—the tendency of individuals to look for 
partners with similar characteristics such as education level and political 
preferences—to predict an increasingly ideologically extreme population 
over a few generations.245 The proposition that a more educated citizenry 
is a more polarized citizenry is surely one of the most dismal strands of 
the literature on polarization. It is also a leap from the existing research, 
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and there is some counter evidence. In general, the literature on the 
effects of intelligence and education on political attitudes is extensive 
and nuanced.246 A group of studies show a correlation between higher 
education (and higher income) and greater ideological coherence.247 Once 
again, a correlation does not establish causation—it is equally “possible 
that more ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more 
years of education”248—and greater consistency is not the same as greater 
ideological extremism.249 If a relationship between more education and 
more polarized political attitudes does exist, that connection should be 
most evident in young adults. The Millennials are the most well-educated 
generational cohort in U.S. history, with more than 60% having attended 
some college.250 There does not appear to be relevant academic research 
focused on this group, but the 2014 Pew study shows less ideological 
consistency among younger voters.251 The two largest clusters of eighteen 
to twenty-nine year olds are Young Outsiders, who are conservative on 
government but liberal on many social issues including immigration and 
the environment,252 and Next Generation Left, who are liberal on social 
issues but generally positive about Wall Street and concerned about the 
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costs of maintaining the social safety net.253 Together these clusters 
account for 38% of this age group, while another 19% fall into the other 
two heavily cross-pressured clusters, Faith and Family Left and Hard-
Pressed Skeptics.254 
Finally, there are demographic trends that suggest the likelihood of 
partisan shifting rather than the entrenchment of polarization. The 
apparent ideological inconsistency of younger voters is an obvious source 
of pressure on both parties to modify their issue positions to attract these 
voters.255 More broadly, the Republican voter base is “overwhelmingly 
white, older, married, religiously observant, and socially conservative—all 
shrinking demographic categories.”256 In particular, the proportion of 
Latino and Asian voters has grown rapidly, and this growth is projected to 
continue.257 The Democratic Party is generally seen as having the edge in 
these demographic trends,258 but there is significant cross-pressuring that 
creates vulnerabilities for Democrats and opportunities for Republicans. 
For example, Latinos as a group are more religious than the median 
American, leading to more conservative positions on social issues like 
abortion.259 Millennials—currently the largest and most racially diverse 
cohort in the U.S.260—tend to be socially liberal and environmentally 
concerned, but they are also economically stressed by educational debt 
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and recession-constrained employment opportunities,261 and worried 
about the cost of the social safety net.262 
In sum, some researchers emphasize demographic trends that 
support a bleak prognosis for depolarizing shifts because these trends 
would be either extremely difficult or socially undesirable to reverse. The 
evidence that any of these trends contribute causally to congressional 
polarization is thin. At the same time, changes in key electoral 
demographics are likely to challenge both parties over the next several 
election cycles to reposition themselves in ways that attract members of 
various cross-pressured groups. 
E. The Bottom Line 
The challenge in explaining and trying to reverse, congressional 
polarization is discovering whether something has been introduced (or, 
conceivably, removed) in the last few decades that both amplifies “normal” 
American political conflict over governing and entrenches it so that the 
historically observed ebb and flow in the levels of legislative partisanism 
can no longer be expected to occur. Theories about causation and remedy 
abound and, in some instances, directly compete, but substantiating 
evidence is rare. So far, at least, it does not appear that some identifiable 
“big bang” set contemporary congressional polarization in motion and 
continues inexorably to drive it. Rather, multiple factors probably 
contribute to the current situation. This should not be surprising given the 
complex of legal, political, cultural, and demographic elements that 
constitute two-party government in a system of separated and shared 
powers in a large, heterogeneous nation. 
Whether this is cause for pessimism or optimism depends on one’s 
perspective. A multiplicity of contributing factors means there is no 
obvious solution—but also means that stasis is unlikely. Indeed, major 
shifts in electorally relevant demographics will create pressure on both 
parties—especially the Republican Party—to undergo the kind of 
redefinition of issue positions that has abated congressional polarization 
in the past. 
CONCLUSION: GETTING PAST POLARIZATION 
“[M]ost of the imbalances I have analyzed . . . have not been major, 
permanent, systemic problems. More precisely, at least during recent generations, 
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many alleged problems have proven to be nonexistent, short-term, limited, 
tolerable, or correctable.” 
~ David Mayhew263 
The system of horizontally and vertically separated, shared and checked 
powers laid out by the Constitution is extraordinarily complex when 
operationalized in a nation of 435 congressional and fifty Senate districts 
comprising 319 million people. As the previous sections demonstrate, just 
uncovering the facts about political behavior, and its underlying motivations 
and causes, can be extremely difficult. With respect to congressional polar-
ization, political science research has provided two competing accounts. 
The standard, parsimonious account, based on roll-call voting 
records, reveals a Congress that is ever more broadly, deeply, and 
consistently divided. This account is complemented by a view of the 
electorate in which the knowledgeable and politically engaged are 
increasingly polarized, ideologically and culturally. This account supports 
the pessimistic prognosis of chronic hyperpartisanship and congressional 
dysfunction. Never before in history has the level of polarization been so 
high or the upward trend so relentless. 
The alternative, more complex account, based on a range of qualitative 
and quantitative evidence, sees motivation and opportunities for cross-party 
coalitions in Congress persisting even in the face of strong ideological and 
strategic partisan pressures. This account is complemented by a view of an 
electorate in which even strong party-identifiers disagree with their party on 
some issues, identifiable subgroups have bundles of liberal and conservative 
preferences, most people say they want government officials to compromise, 
and only a minority believes that either party currently represents them well. 
This account could not be categorized as optimistic about Congress’s future, 
but it is at least possibilistic about a shift in contemporary institutional 
dysfunction. History reveals that partisan conflict is the norm in American 
government, and Congress has recovered from past periods of debilitatingly 
high conflict. 
Choosing between these accounts may have more to do with one’s 
individual brain physiology than with objectively verifiable facts.264 
When, however, the focus shifts from descriptions of the current 
state of congressional polarization to predictions about its future course 
and prescriptions for reform, the historical record seems clearly on the 
side of skepticism and wariness. 
In the 1950s, the American Political Science Association (APSA) 
emphatically urged the major parties to become more ideologically 
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cohesive, programmatic, and divergent in order to give voters a sharply 
defined, genuine choice.265 For “responsible” government, APSA argued, 
the parties must be integrated, loyal, and highly disciplined so that they 
might act on and be held accountable for their promised program.266 In 
other words, during the nostalgically recalled mid-century era of low 
polarization, the wisdom of the day was that what Americans really needed 
was the kind of parties we have today.267 
In the 1960s, the target for institutional reform was the seniority-
driven committee system of governance in the House. This system—
which was rooted in reforms now viewed as helping to reverse the high 
polarization of the 1890 to 1910 era268—was condemned for creating 
autonomous fiefdoms that undermined the power of party leaders and 
prevented adoption of a coherent legislative program.269 The committee 
system was finally “fixed” in the Republican Revolution in 1995, when 
Speaker Gingrich initiated the changes270 many now blame for 
enhancing extremist voices, punishing defections from the party line, 
and burying measures with bipartisan support.271 
The 1970s problematized rising congressional incumbency rates.272 To 
remedy this “electoral stagnation,”273 term limits and other reform 
proposals sought greater democratic accountability through greater 
turnover among Members.274 Now, it appears that turnover has been 
driving ideological divergence within Congress, with new members 
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contributing most to the perceived disconnect between representatives 
and most of those they represent.275 
Throughout the 1980s, the renaissance of conservative constitutional 
theory within academia and the Reagan Administration created the strong 
unitary executive interpretation that systematically empowered the President 
at the expense of Congress.276 This sea change in separation-of-powers 
theory was a rational policy development given established political wisdom 
of the day: Due to a variety of demographic and structural factors, 
Republicans would likely control the Presidency over time, while Democrats 
had a lock on the House.277 Today, these same factors favor continued 
Republican dominance of the House and suggest that mostly Democratic 
presidents will likely reap the benefits of unitary executive theory.278 
Obviously, there are limits to even the best efforts to diagnose and 
“fix” problems with the structure of government set up by the 
Constitution. 
This humbling recognition ought to restrain any instinct to dismiss, 
as naïve or pollyannaish, Professor Mayhew’s assessment that the system 
has developed self-correcting impulses that enable the House, Senate, 
and presidency, over time, generally to work the way they are supposed 
to.279 In the months surrounding this Symposium, important instances of 
bipartisan accommodation began to emerge from Congress. The Senate 
overwhelmingly approved legislation establishing congressional review of 
the proposed Iran nuclear deal; in the process, Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell used his procedural power against newer Republican 
members to prevent “tougher” amendments that would have cost 
Democratic support.280 The House, by a strong bipartisan vote, passed a 
legislative package that solved a longstanding problem with fees paid to 
Medicare physicians,281 even as some Republicans complained that it 
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added to the deficit.282 A flurry of bipartisan negotiation resulted in the 
Senate approving fast-track authority for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations, despite opposition from the right and the left,283 and House 
Speaker Boehner meted out discipline to a group of fractious Republican 
members who tried, unsuccessfully, to derail its bipartisan passage in the 
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